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Until 1960, lawyers appeared to assume that the workmen's
compensation insurance carrier partook of the employer's immunity
to common law suit by an injured employee. Since then there has been
a rapid, succession ofJudicial decisions, some holding the carrier liable
as a third party, for negligent safety inspections or medical services.
some holding the opposite. This article analyzes the state and
direction of the law produced by these decisions and related legislative
amendments, and proposes a solution.
Of all the developments in the volatile field of third-party
litigation under workmen's compensation, none has been so
dramatic and fast-moving as the line of cases in which injured
employees have attempted to treat the compensation carrier as a
third party for purposes of tort suits, based usually on alleged
negligence in either safety inspections or medical services. The
present discussion will attempt to bring some order out of the welter
of cross-currents and violent disagreements that characterize this
class of decisions, but it must be stressed that at this writing the law
is in a formative stage. In some key states the latest decisions are
from intermediate courts, with courts 3f last resort still to be heard
from. Legislatures too are busy, sometimes reversing the courts,
sometimes confirming them, and sometimes doing a little of each.
The most important single legal issue in the area is this: Under
a statute that does not plainly identify the carrier with the employer
in its third-party or exclusive-remedy passages, or use language
unmistakably showing intent that the carrier should not be treated
as a third party, can the carrier be sued for negligence in the
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performance of such functions as making safety inspections and
actually performing, as distinguished from paying for, medical
services? On this issue, it would be rash at this time to announce that,
this or that is the "majority rule." What weight, for a start, should
be given to carefully-reasoned decisions by high appellate courts
which are then reversed by legislative action? Shall we say, as one
court has done, that this discredits the decisions altogether, because
it proves that the court was wrong all along about what the
legislature intended?1 This line of reasoning seems highly artificial,
if only because the chances are that the legislature writing the
amendment does not contain a single survivor of the legislature that
wrote the language interpreted by the court, and so the current
legislature has no more idea of what was originally intended than
anyone else. In a state whose own statute still resembles the original
statute before the amendment, it makes much better sense to say that
a decision superseded by a statutory amendment is as good authority
as it ever was. After all, as to authorities from sister states, what is
at work is not stare decisis, but the persuasive force of the reasoning
and judgment of a respected court-and the amendment of a statute
certainly does not change that.
THE THIRD PARTY CONTROVERSY: A DECISIONAL OUTLINE
The modern story began with the 1960 New Hampshire case of
Smith v. American Employers' Insurance Co.2 The plaintiff had lost
both her legs as the result of an explosion allegedly due to the
negligence of the insurance company in making safety inspections,
a function which it had assumed. It- was held that an action would
lie against the carrier and that the carrier was not protected by the
exclusive-remedy clause of the compensation act. In short, the
carrier could be sued as a third party when the other facts necessary
to liability were present.
'Bartolotta v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 66 (D. Conn. 1967). The court brushes aside
Smith v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564 (1960) (discussed in
note 2 infra and accompanying text), and Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 174 (3d
Cir. 1963), rev'g 211 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (discussed in note 6 infra), because of
subsequent statutory amendments, saying: "The Court is inclined to the view that such
amendments indicate that the prior court decisions misinterpreted legislative intent." 276 F.
Supp. at 73.
2102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564 (1960). The decision was shortly afterward nullified by
statutory amendment, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.2 (1966), which provides "[e]xcept where
the context specifically indicates otherwise, the term 'employer' shall be deemed to include the
employer's insurance carrier." Id.
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Smith appears to have been the first case involving alleged
negligence in safety inspections as a ground for third-party liability
of the carrier. It was by no means the first case, however, to present
the basic question whether a carrier can ever be sued as a third party;
several earlier cases had been concerned with malpractice by
physicians selected by the insurer, but all were decided in favor of
the carrier3 The New Hampshire court passed over them as "not
3District of Columbia: See Fernandez v. Gantz, 113 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1953). The carrier
was held not liable in case of alleged malpractice of physician selected by employer, "in the
absence of any negligence in the selection of such physician, which is not here alleged." Id.
at 764. The implication is that the carrier is thus not necessarily immune as such.
California: Sarber v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 23 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1928); Fitzpatrick v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 7 Cal. 2d 230, 60 P.2d 276 (1936); Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 172 Cal.
App. 2d 731, 342 P.2d 976 (1959); Nelson v. Associated Indem. Corp., 19 Cal. App. 2d 564,
66 P.2d 184 (1937).
Idaho: Schulz v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 125 F. Supp. 411, 415 (E.D. Wash. 1954), holding
that under a third-party statute referring to "some other person than the employer," the
carrier cannot be sued by an employee injured by the malpractice of a physician examining
the employee for the insurer. The opinion says the physician was "selected and employed"
by the carrier. The significance of this case was questioned in Smith v. American Employers'
Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 537, 163 A.2d 564, 570 (1960) (discussed in note 2 supra and
accompanying text) on the ground that 'it cannot be said with certainty precisely upon what
grounds the decision rests," and on the ground that the main basis for the decision appears
to be that the remedies against the employer and a third person were mutually exclusive and
would open the door to a double recovery.
Schulz also leaves some doubt on the point left open by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court in Fernandez v. Gantz, supra. The court in Schulz relies on Fernandez which, however,
as noted above, leaves a strong implication that the carrier might not be immune to suit for
its own direct negligence in selection of a physician. In Schulz, the plaintiff apparently did
not allege any such negligence but proceeded on the theory that the carrier had a sort of
vicarious liability for the physician. The statement by the court that the doctor was "'a
Spokane physician selected and employed by defendant" is not amplified; it seems doubtful
that the physician was "employed" in the master-servant sense. Then, at the very end of its
opinion the court says: "In view of the conclusion which I have reached, it is not necessary
to consider defendant's contention that, in any event it would not be liable for the negligence
of a physician selected to examine the plaintiff in the absence of negligence in the selection."
This seems to leave matters in a posture similar to that in the District of Columbia under
Fernandez, with the issue of possible carrier liability not entirely settled in cases where actual
carrier negligence in selection or in direct treatment is alleged.
Missouri: Hughes v. Maryland Cas. Co., 229 Mo. App. 472, 76 S.W.2d 1101 (1934). This
case holds that the compensation carrier cannot be sued for negligent medical services of
physicians "employed" by the carrier. The court said: "The insurer is not a negligent third
person, within the meaning of section 3309 [Mo. REv. STAT. § 3309 (1929)]." Id. at 476, 76
S.W.2d at 1104. Section 3325, Mo. REv. STAT. § 3325 (1929), provides that the liability of
the employer shall be secondary and that of the insurer primary and the latter shall be directly
liable to the insured employee. A negligent third person, within the meaning of the act, is one
upon whom no liability could be entailed under the act. Sylcox v. National Lead Co., 225
Mo. App. 543, 547, 38 S.W.2d 497 (1931). Under the provisions of Section 3325, the insurer
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in point," partly because they arose under different statutes. In view
of the dearth of authority, however, they might well have been given
a little more attention; the central issue of carrier immunity is
essentially the same in the inspection and malpractice cases, and
most courts since Smith have, as is here done, treated them together.
The opening argument in the Smith opinion is disarmingly
simple. The question is whether the insurer is "some person other
than the employer." Is the carrier a "person"? Yes, by statutory
definition. Is it one "other than the employer"? Of course, if the
word "other" means anything.
There is a certain poignancy in the fact that the court cites a
Massachusetts case4 as its authority at this point for giving words
the meaning they have in common usage, for Massachusetts has
ended at the opposite pole from this refreshingly direct reading of
statutory language. Not only have Massachusetts courts somehow
interpreted "the insured" to mean all the contractors and
subcontractors on the job, and "employer" to mean "employee," '
but now have crowned the process by holding "insured" to mean
"insurer."'
is substituted for the employer and "the carrier is subrogated to all the rights and duties of
the employer." Sarber v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 23 F.2d 434,435 (9th Cir. 1928).
Missouri subsequently amended its statute to bolster this result further: "Any reference to
the employer shall also include his insurer." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.030.3 (1965).
Texas: Martin v. Consolidated Cas. Ins. Co., 138 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1943), involved an
attempt by the deceased employee's widow to sue the carrier under a wrongful death statute
for the negligent aggravation of the injury by physicians provided by the carrier. The court
said: "It is settled law in Texas that the insurer stands in the place of the employer and may
be held accountable only as the employer may be ... ." Id. at 899. The Texas third-party
statute speaks of "some person othei than the subscriber." TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
8307, § 6a (1967).
'McDonald v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 288 Mass. 170, 192 N.E. 608 (1934).
An employee's injuries were aggravated by the alleged malpractice of the physician selected
by the carrier. It was held that a carrier was a third party amenable to suit, but that the
employee's election to proceed under the compensation act precluded an action at law against
the insurer.
5Bresnahan v. Barre, 286 Mass. 593, 190 N.E. 815 (1934). A detailed discussion is presented
in 2 A. LARSON. THE LAW OF WORKMEN' COMPENSATION § 72.32 (1968).
'Matthews v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 410, 238 N.E.2d 348 (1968), The court held
that "insurer" is not "some person other than insured," and therefore may not be sued for
negligent performance of an allegedly assumed duty to inspect employment premises. The
court declined to follow the implications of contrary language in McDonald v. Employers'
Liability Assurance Corp., 288 Mass. 170, 192 N.E. 608 (1934) (discussed in note 4 supra).
The opinion in Matthews supplies an example of the hazards of stringing together a list of
cases from other jurisdictions reaching the result of carrier immunity, without regard for
distinctions between the statutes on which the decisions were based.
After defining "the question" as "whether the insurer is 'some person other than the
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The New Hampshire court, then, having set forth the plain
meaning of the statutory words, rightly proceeds on the theory that
the burden from that point on would be to show a statutory intent
different from the obvious meaning of the words. One by one the
court briskly disposes of many of the arguments that have been
worked over at great length in subsequent cases. The fact that the
carrier would be subrogated to a claim against itself did not trouble
the court; the amount of compensation could simply be set off, thus
preventing a double recovery. The argument that the insurer has
contracted to step into the employer's shoes is answered on straight
contract grounds: An agreement between these two persons, to which
the employee is not a party, cannot detract from the employee's
rights against the carrier. The now-familiar argument that
permitting recovery would have "undesirable results"-discourage-
ment of voluntary safety services by carriers-is met in one sentence:
"There is force in this contention but as we have often held such
a question of policy is for the Legislature and not for this court."I
The court concludes with a reminder that it cannot bar fundamental
common law rights "in the absence of any provisions to this effect
in the law," especially under a statute that is to be liberally
interpreted.
The theme of the dissent in this three-to-two decision is, in effect,
that throughout the history of the act it was always assumed that
the insurer stood in the shoes of the employer. This is largely true.
But the reports are full of cases in which what everybody had for
years assumed turned out to be wrong.8
insured'," the court enumerated a supposed majority of jurisdictions answering "the
question" in the negative by citing Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 358 F.2d
799 (4th Cir. 1966), Sarber v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 23 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1928), and West v.
Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 697 (E.D.-Mo. 1966), all from states whose statutes
identify the carrier with the employer. The court also cites Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
244 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Mich. 1965), affd, 372 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1967), which had been
discredited by Ray v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 10 Mich. App. 55, 158 N.W.2d 786 (1968). This
was perhaps understandable since, although Ray was decided almost three months before
Matthews, it was released for publication only ten days before. What is not forgivable is the
inclusion in the "majority" of Hill v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 272 F. Supp. 569
(M.D. Fla. 1967), followed by the words, "(Florida Workmen's Compensation Act)." Hill is
not a workmen's compensation case at all. It happens to differ from Nelson v. Union Wire
Rope Corp., 31 11. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964), rev'g 39 11. App. 2d 73, 187 N.E.2d 425
(1963) (discussed in note 10 infra and accompanying text) on a point of tort law, but never
goes near the workmen's compensation law issue for which the Massachusetts court cites it.
7Smith v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 534, 163 A.2d 564, 568 (1960).
sSee, e.g., Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945), holding
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As might have been expected, the Smith case caused some
consternation in the insurance community. Fabricius v. Montgomery
Elevator Co.,' a case reaching a similar result in Iowa, appeared
three years later. But what really set off the alarm bells was Nelson
v. Union Wire Rope Corp.,10 decided the following year, in which
the Illinois Supreme Court, applying the Florida statute, upheld a
judgment of $1,569,400 against a carrier based on negligent
performance of a gratuitous safety inspection. Perhaps the sheer size
of the judgment added to the shock. The two jurisdictions involved
were major ones. And, although the vote on the decision was four-
to-three, it is significant that the dissent was based entirely on the
tort issue, that is, the extent of the liability of one who voluntarily
undertakes a duty. Justice Schaefer, writing for the dissent, said:
"When there has been reliance, or when the insurer has taken over
the inspection duties of another, there should be liability: But in the
absence of those circumstances, I am unable to see any sound reason
for imposing liability."'
Thus, unlike the Smith case, in which the dissent went to the
compensation law exclusive-remedy issue, the Nelson case stands as
a decision, without dissent, that a compensation carrier can be made
liable as a third party in tort for negligence in safety inspections.
After Nelson, suits against carriers involving both safety inspection
and malpractice appeared in jurisdiction after -jurisdiction,
accompanied by a corresponding burst of activity in legislatures.
illegal the kind of control structure that thousands of close corporations had used for many
years.
'254 Iowa 1319, 121 N.W.2d 361 (1963). A compensation carrier may be liable as a third
party amenable to suit for an employee's injuries caused by the alleged negligent failure to
inspect, note, and advise the employer of a defective elevator, if the carrier had assumed the
duty to perform such service. The case was remanded for trial on the issues.
However, in 1965 the Iowa legislature amended its code to provide that no inspection of
any place of employment made by an insurance company or other inspectors shall be the basis
for imposition of civil liability upon the inspector or upon the insurance company or other
person employing the inspector. IOWA CODE ANN. § 88A.14 (1966).
1031 Ill. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964), rev'g 39 Ill. App. 2d 73, 187 N.E.2d 425 (1963).
Injuries and fatalities suffered by employees of the general contractor and his subcontractors
were found to have been caused by the negligent performance of the workmen's compensation
carrier safety engineer's inspection of a material hoist. The Illinois Supreme Court, construing
the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act, held that the carrier did not share the employer's
immunity by identification with the employernor was the carrier immune as a subcontractor
on the same project.
"1d. at 121, 199 N.E.2d at 797 (emphasis added).
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AN ANALYSIS OF Two APPROACHES
The main outlines of the controversy are by now sufficiently clear
to permit a systematic analysis of this volatile and hotly-contested
issue. One may begin by identifying two approaches to the question,
the conceptual and the functional. The conceptual approach asks:
Who is the carrier? Is he a third party? The functional approach
asks: What was the carrier doing? And what was the relation of that
function to the act?
The Conceptual Approach
Under the first approach, the emphasis is on trying to extract
from the language of the act any clues on whether the carrier was
meant to be assimilated to the employer, or in any other way
excluded from the third-party category. For the sake of
completeness, we may begin with statutes that virtually dispose of
the issue by express language. Among these statutes, some of which,
as noted above, were deliberately enacted to reverse or confirm
judicial holdings, are those of Alabama,12 Colorado,13 Delaware,14
Georgia, 5 Hawaii," Illinois,"7 Indiana,t8 Iowa," Maine,21 Missouri,2'
12"The term 'employer' . . . shall if the employer is insured, include his insurer as far as
applicable. . .. ' ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 262(d) (1958).
3"[N]or shall such employer or the insurance carrier, if any, insuring such employer's
liability under this chapter be subject to any other liability whatsoever ...." COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 81-2-6 (1967). Section 81-18-8 contains a similar express immunity as to the
occupational disease article.
""'Employer' . . . if the employer is insured, the term shall include the insurer as far as
practicable ...." DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 19, § 2301 (1953).
s 'Employer' . . . [i]f the employer is insured, this term shall include his insurer as far
as applicable." GA. CODE ANN. § 114-101 (1956).
"The insurer of an employer is subject to such employer's liabilities and entitled to his
rights and remedies under this Chapter as far as applicable." HAWAn REV. STAT. § 386-1
(1968).
"ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5 (1967), as amended Pub. Act No. 76-282, § 5 (July 1,
1969), extending immunity beyond the employer and his employees to "his insurer, his broker,
any service organization retained by the employer, his insurer or his broker to provide safety
service, advice or recommendations for the employer or the agents or employers of any of
them .. "
"1"[He and those conducting his business and his workmen's compensation insurance
carrier (are liable) . . . only to the extent and in the manner herein specified." IND. ANN.
STAT. § 40-1205 (1965).
"IOWA CODE ANN. § 88A.14 (1966). See note l0supra.
""'Employer' .. .and if the employer is insured, it includes the insurer unless the contrary
intent is apparent from the context or it is inconsistent with the purpose of this Act." Ma.
Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 2(6) (1964).
"1"Any reference to the employer shall also include his insurer." Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 287.030.3 (1965). See note 3 supra.
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Nebraska,22  New Hampshire," New Mexico, 2" Oregon,25
Pennsylvania," South Dakota, 7 Tennessee,'2 Texas, 9 Vermont, -0
Virginia,3 1 and Wisconsin. 3 2 Although the California statute
22
"For the purpose of this section if the employer carries a policy of workmen's
compensation insurance, the term employer shall also include the insurer." NED. REV.
STAT. § 48-111 (1968).
="Except where the context specifically indicates otherwise, the term 'employer' shall be
deemed to include the employer's insurance carrier." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281 "2 (1966).
214"Nothing in the Workmen's Compensation Act, however, shall affect, or be construed to
affect, in any way, the existence of, or the mode of trial of, any claim or cause of action which
the workman has against any person other than his employer, or the insurer, guarantor or
surety of his employer." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-4(F) (1953).
21"The exemption from liability given to an employer under this section is also extended to
the employer's insurer,, the board, and the employees, officers and directors of the employer,
the employer's insurer .. " ORE. REv. STAT. § 656.018(3) (1967).
23PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 77, § 501 (1967): "Such insurer shall assume the employer's liability
hereunder and shall be entitled to all of the employer's immunities and protection hereunder
...." This statute was designed to reverse the result in Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 323
F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963), rev'g 211 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Pa. 1962), which involved an employee
injured as a result of alleged negligent inspection of the premises for safety hazards. The court
held the employer's immunity not applicable to the compensation carrier, and remanded for
trial on the issue of negligence. Contra, Roney v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (Pa. C.P.,
Philadelphia County, unreported, 1961). The compensation carrier was found not to have
established a duty toward an injured employee for alleged negligent performance of safety
inspection services. Raines v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 391
Pa. 175, 137 A.2d 257 (1958). The employee's action was against the compensation carrier
for breach of contract in negligently failing to furnish medical services:,The court held that
the carrier's sole liability on the insurance policy contract was to pay the statutory workmen's
.compensation benefits.
27
"Employer . . . . If the employer is insured, it shall include his insurer as far as
applicable." S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 62-1-2 (1967).
="Employer . . . . If the employer is insured, it shall include his insurer, unless otherwise
herein provided." TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-902(a) (1966).
2The association, its agent, servant or employee shall have no liability with respect to
any accident based on the allegation that such accident was caused by or could have
been prevented by a program, inspection or other activity or service undertaken by the
association for the prevention of accidents in connection with operations of its
subscriber. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (1967).
"*"If the employer is insured, 'employer' includes his insurer as far as applicable." VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 601(3) (1967).
"' In the definition of employer, the Virginia statute states, as to the term "employer": "If
the employer is insured it includes his insurer so far as applicable." VA. CODE ANN, § 65-3
(1950). This leaves the plaintiff very little scope; he must do the best he can with "so far as
applicable." In Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 358 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1966),
plaintiff tried to squeeze something out of this phrase, but failed. The action was for the
"carrier's negligence in pursuing the employee-safety measures it has assumed." The carrier
was held immune from suit. The court pointed out that Virginia courts limited the third-party
concept to "a stranger to the business." Id. at 800; see Rea v. Ford, 198 Va. 712, 96 S.E.2d
92, 95 (1957). It then added that the carrier's liability in Virginia is primary under Section
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expressly equates insurer and employer for purposes of the
subrogation provision, leaving open the question whether the
identification should be carried beyond that portion of the statute,
the California courts have settled the question by choosing to apply
the identification to the act as a whole.ss
65-107, which hardly makes it a stranger. Such cases as Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 323
F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963), revg 211 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Nelson v. Union Wire Rope
Corp., 31 111. 2d 69,199 N.E.2d 769 (1964); and Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254
Iowa 1319, 121 N.W.2d 361 (1963), were easily distinguished by the absence in each case of
a statute so explicitly identifying the carrier. with the employer. The court also invoked the
Virginia concept that "the entire industrial family' is immune from suit." 358 F.2d at 799;
see Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d 73 (1946).
3
"Compensation is made the exclusive remedy against "the employer and the workmen's
compensation insurance carrier," Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.03(2) (1957), and the third-party
provision, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.29(1) (1957), states that a claim against the employer or
insurer would not bar a suit in tort against "any other" party (emphasis added). See Kerner
v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 35 Wis. 2d 391, 151 N.W.2d 72 (1967) (safety-
inspection case--carrier held immune under Wisconsin statute).
In 1965 Wisconsin enacted the following general provision:
The furnishing of or failure to furnish safety inspections or advisory services intended
to reduce the likelihood of injury, death or loss shall not subject the insurer, its agent
or employee undertaking to perform such services as an incident to insurance, to
liability for damages from injury, death or loss occurring as a result of any act or
omission in the course of such services. This section shall not apply if: the active
negligence of the insurer, its agent or employee, created the condition which was the
proximate cause of injury, death or loss, nor shall it apply to such services when
required to be performed under the provisions of a written service contract. Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 895.44 (1966).
3Burns v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 265 Cal. App. 2d 98, 71 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1968).
The State Fund was held not subject to suit as a third party for alleged negligent inspections
at lumber mill; Rating Bureau held immune by force of explicit statute, CAL. INS.
CODE § 11758 (West 1955), ruling out civil liability for acts of Bureau.
In the main portion of its opinion the court said that the point had recently been decided
in State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Ct. (the Breceda case), 237 Cal. App. 2d 416,
46 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1965), in which the facts and issue were substantially similar. Only one
cited authority had come out since Breceda, Mager v. United Hosp., 88 N.J. Super. 421, 212
A,2d 664 (1965), affd per curiam, 46 N.J. 398, 217 A.2d 325 (1966) (discussed in notes 77-
78 infra and accompanying text), which the Burns court attempted to distinguish on the
ground that the inspection function was more "'intertwined" with the insurer's compensation
role than the medical services in Mager.
As to California's statutory background, its subrogation section, Labor Code § 3850
states: "As used in this chapter: ... (b) 'Employer' includes insurer as defined in this
division." CAL. LABOR CODE § 3850 (West 1955). On the strength of this statutory language,
the court distinguished the cases of Nelson v. Union Vire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 199
N.E.2d 769 (1964); Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 121 N.W.2d 361
(1963); and Smith v: American Employers' Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564 (1960),
in none of which was there a statute so identifying the insurer with the employer. Section 3850,
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In the next category are those statutes that, while not expressly
identifying the carrier with the employer, use language containing a
strong implication to that effect. A good example is the Arkansas
statute34 which, closely resembling the Wisconsin statute, states that
a claim against the employer or insurer will not bar a suit in tort
against any other party. Both the Wisconsin and Arkansas courts
have reasoned that the carrier cannot be "other" than itself.
By the same token, under the familiar type of statute that
authorizes third-party suits against a "person other than the
employer," it can be effectively argued, as the court did in the Smith
case,3 that the juxtaposition of the word "other" with the word
"employer" (not "employer and insurer") can only mean that the
insurer is "other" than the employer.
In many of the opinions which approach the issue conceptually,
the statutes are combed for whatever implications might be drawn
from express mention or omission of mention of the insurer at
various points other than the three affecting the issue directly: the
definition of employer, the exclusiveness section, and the third-party
literally read, confines this identification of employer and insurer to the subrogation section,
but the court in State Fund chose to treat it as if it suffused the entire compensation statute.
California has, in addition, a peculiar quirk in its statute that causes complications of its
own. California Labor Code § 3755 says:
[l]f after the suffering of any injury the insurer causes to be served upon any
compensation claimant a notice that it has assumed and agreed to pay any
compensation ...such employer shall b relieved from liability . . . .The insurer
shall ... be substituted in place of the employer . . . . CAL. LAaOR CODE § 3755
(West Supp. 1968) (emphasis added).
The only difficulty with this provision in the inspection cases is that the negligent conduct of
the carrier occurs before the suffering of the injury. This distinction may assume importance
in the malpractice cases, since negligent treatment of a compensable injury comes after the
suffering of an injury. See the line of cases holding compensation carriers not liable for
malpractice of physicians selected by the carrier, note 3 supra. Sarber v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
23 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1928), for example, expressly recognizes that substitution of the insurer
for the employer is a condition precedent to the insurer's inheriting the employer's immunity.
The Breceda and State Fund results, then, are not necessarily dictated by unambiguous
statutory language. Section 3850 could readily have been confined to the subrogation function
and § 3755 seems inapplicable to a wrong occurring before the injury and resultant
substitution of the carrier for the employer.
UARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-1305 & 81-337 (1956). See. e.g., Horne v. Security Mut. Cas.
Co., 265 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Ark. 1967). Carrier held immune under the wording of the
Arkansas third-party provision, in which the words "employer or carrier" are closely followed
by "any third party," thus identifying the employer and carrier in third-party situations, and
disassociating the carrier from "any third party."
'WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.29(l) (1957). See note 32 supra.
'See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
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section. Thus, the familiar provisions that notice to the employer
shall be notice to the carrier, that jurisdiction of the employer shall
be jurisdiction of th- carrier, and that an award against the employer
shall bind the carrier, have been invoked as evidence of the identity
of employer and carrier.3 7 Courts holding carriers-suable have
countered this argument by saying that these sections identify
employer and carrier for procedural purposes only, and are not
intended to affect substantive rights.3s Indeed, the argument can cut
both ways. The Illinois court in Nelson, after recognizing that the
employer and carrier were mentioned together at some points in the
act, argued:
Similarly, the use of the word "employer" in some sections of the act, while
using the words "employer, or his insurer" in others, has significance under
the rules of construction which state that words employed are to be given their
plain meanings, and that the use by the legislature of certain language in one
instance and wholly different language in another indicates that different
results were intended. . . .Had it been the legislative intent that all rights,
duties, and liabilities of the employer and his insurer were to be equated,
particularly as to the matter of exclusive liability, it would not have
mentioned the insurer as an alternate in some sections, while failing to
mention it in others.3 '
A statutory distinction that has figured prominently in judicial
opinions on the issue of carriers' third-party status is that between
primary and secondary liability of the carrier to the compensation
claimant. The Nelson opinion had much to do with this emphasis.
Having reached its decision 'through the kind of analysis of the
Florida statute just described, bolstered by related cases from
Florida and by the Fabricius and Smith cases, the Illinois court
turned to the task of distinguishing several contra cases of the
malpractice type.' It chose to base its distinction primarily on the
ground that the contra holdings all arose under statutes in which the
*See, e.g., Bartolotta v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 66 (D. Conn. 1967). More than a dozen
such items are found in the Connecticut act. Applying the Connecticut act in an action based
on negligence for failure to inspect machinery, resulting in leakage of argon gas, the court
held the carrier was immune from liability as a "third person." Id.
-uSee. e.g., Mays v.Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963), rev'g 211 F. Supp.
541 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 111. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964),
rev'g 39 Iii. App. 2d .73, 187 N.E.2d 425 (1963); Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254
Iowa 1319, 121 N.W.2d 361 (1963); Mager v. United Hosp., 88 N.J. Super. 421, 212,
A.2d 664 (1965), affdper curiam, 46 N.J. 398, 217 A.2d 325 (1966).
nNelson v. United Wire Rope Corp., 31 111. 2d 69, 100, 199 N.E.2d 769, 786 (1964).
"*The court cited the Sarber (California), Schulz (Idaho), Hughes (Missouri), and Martin
(Texas) cases, all discussed in'note 3 supra.
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carrier's liability to pay compensation is primary or can be
substituted for that of the employer, while the Florida act "has no
comparable provision which expressly makes the insurer primarily
and directly liable to an injured employee . . . ."I' This primary-
secondary distinction has in turn been used to distinguish Nelson in
states having primary insurer liability, such as Massachusetts."
It is unfortunate that this distinction has acquired such a
conspicuous place in these dgcisions.13 It may be useful as a make-
weight in building up a case one way or the other, but one cannot
help asking: What difference of substance does it really make? The
carrier is going to pay in the end. Should anything as crucial as its
immunity from third-party suit turn on something as technical and
ultimately inconsequential as whether the legislature happened to
make its liability primary or secondary? After all, the argument does
not 'really reach the true question: Is the insurer the employer? He
may be primarily liable for an obligation of the employer. This is
still not the same as saying that he is the employer. And unless he
is, he must be some person other than the employer.
The California statute goes further than merely imposing
primary liability on the carrier; after the carrier has assumed
liability, the act goes on to say that the carrier is "substituted in
place of the employer," and indeed the employer is relieved of
liability. This idea of substitution goes much further in the direction
of identification than the mere imposition of primary liability, and,
coupled with other special features of the California statute,4 makes
that state's decisions largely unusable as precedents in other
jurisdictions.
It is by no means impossible for a state with a primary liability
statutory background to find the carrier suable. In Michigan the
issue first arose in a federal district court, which relied heavily on
"this primary, unvariable responsibility" of the carrier to justify a
ruling that the carrier was not intended to be a third party." But
"131 Il. 2d at 105, 199 N.E.2d at 789.
12Matthews v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 470, 238 N.E.2d 348 (1968).
'3See. e.g., Perrin, Workmen's Compensation Insurer's Immunity to Claims of Its Insured's
Employee, 3 THE FORUM 86 (1968), which concludes that this is "the single most significant
standard."
"See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
"Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 244 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Mich. 1965), affd, 372 F.2d
95 (6th Cir. 1967). It should be noted that Kotarski, before it was disavowed as a statement
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when it fell to the Michigan court itself to provide an authoritative
reading of its own statute, the court, while quoting the relevant
passage of the Michigan act in full,"6 did not find in it any
compulsion to change the plain meaning of the words "employer"
and "insurer." 47
Another argument extensively exploited in decisions barring
third-party suits against carriers runs like this: The carrier is
subrogated to the injured employee's cause of action against a third-
party tortfeasor; if the carrier can be a third-party tortfeasor, the
carrier will end by suing itself, and the legislature could not have
intended such a "ludicrously incongruous"" result.49 This argument
of Michigan law by the Michigan court, had been widely cited and relied upon in jurisdictions
holding insurers immune.
"The carrier "hereby assumes all obligations imposed upon the said employer ..
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.195(e) (1968).
"Ray v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 10 Mich. App. 55, 158 N.W.2d 786 (1968). Under the
Michigan third-party statute, referring to "some person other than a natural person in the
same employ or the employer," MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.189 (1968), an insurer can be sued
as a third party on the ground that it voluntarily undertook to provide safety inspection
services and allegedly negligently performed this undertaking. The court discredits the contrary
holding of the federal court in Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 244 F. Supp. 547 (E.D.
Mich. 1965), aff'd, 372 F.2d 95 (6th .Cir. 1967), which, on substantially similar facts,
purported to interpret the Michigan statute.
"Barrette v. Travelers Ins. Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 1, 246 A.2d 102 (1968). Insurer was held
not suable as third party for negligent inspection of machinery under third-party statute
referring to "'some other person than the employer," CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-293
(Supp. 1969), and an exclusiveness provision limited to the employer, CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN, § 31-284 (Supp. 1969).
"Mustapha v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 387 F.2d 631 (1st Cir. 1967), affg 268 F. Supp. 890
(D.R.I. 1967). Applying the Rhode Island statute, the court held that a suit would not lie
against an insurance carrier that had paid compensation benefits, for negligence in inspecting
the employer's plant and machinery. The court did not feel bound to an opposite view by
Peabody v. Insurance Co. of N. America, Civil No. 66-112 (Super. Ct. Washington County,
June 30, 1967), for reasons that are by no means clear from the federal court's brief opinion.
It quotes the Rhode Island case as saying that "if defendant linsurer] actually made an
inspection and negligently failed to discover a danger or having discovered it failed to warn
of the danger, defendant may be held liable in n6gligence." But merely because the Rhode
Island court then went on to cite Smith v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163
A.2d 564 (1960), a case decided under New Hampshire law and later in effect reversed by
statutory amendment, see note 2 supra, the federal court concluded, "'We therefore do not
construe the Rhode Island case as a decisive interpretation of Rhode Island law. ... 387
F.2d at 632.
See also, among the opinions relying on the incongruity of an insurer suing itself, Kotarski
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 244 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Mich. 1965), aff d, 372 F.2d 95 (6th Cir.
1967); Schulz v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 125 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Wash. 1954); and Flood v.
Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 230 Md. 373, 187 A.2d 320 (1963) (discussed in note 55 infra and
accompanying text).
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has been rejected on several grounds by courts finding carrier
liability. One is that the subrogation provisions are purely
procedural and thus cannot be held to modify the definition of
"employer.""e Another is that the subrogation passage "does not
deal with the subject matter" in issue, which is the question whether
the employee's common law right is taken away from him." The
original Smith case" invoked a sort of dual-capacity doctrine, saying
that the carrier was being sued not as compensation carrier but as
an independent third party. All such cases made short work of the
specter of double recovery by pointing out that the carrier would of
course be entitled to set off in a judgment against itself as tortfeasor
the amount of compensation paid by it as insurance carrier." And,
running throughxall these opinions was the thought that this kind of
result was really not all that preposterous. By now the law is
becoming quite accustomed to apparent incongruities of this kind,
what with corporations, insurers, and even individuals "wearing
different hats."54 Increasingly common is the spectacle of an
insurance carrier acting as compensation subrogation plaintiff and
as defendant insurer on a third party's automobile liability risk.
Problems of conflict of interest and of public policy may arise, but
no one worries much any more about the conceptual problem of
whether the carrier can sue itself. The present issue is not essentially
different once it is recognized that the compensation carrier is being
sued, not as compensation carrier, but as clinic operator or safety
"Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963), rev'g 211 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.
Pa. 1962). See note 26 supra.
"Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 121 N.W.2d 361 (1963). See note
9 supra and accompanying text.
uSee note 2 supra and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963), rev g 211 F. Supp.
541 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (discussed in note 26 supra); Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill.
2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964) (discussed in note 10 supra and accompanying text); Fabricius
v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 121 N.W.2d 361 (1963) (discussed in note 9
supra and accompanying text); Smith v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163
A.2d 564 (1960) (discussed in note 2 supra and accompanying text); Mager v. United Hosp.,
88 N.J. Super. 421, 212 A.2d 664 (1965), affd per curiam, 46 N.J. 398, 217 A.2d 325 (1966)
(discussed in notes 77-78 infra and accompanying text).
"For an example of a subdivided natural person, see Duprey v. Shane, 241 P.2d 78 (Cal.
App.), afrd, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952), holding that an employer-chiropractor who
personally treated an employee was suable as a doctor. See also such comparable questions
as that of the employer's contributing negligence in his suit as subrogee against a third party
and the various dual-capacity situations discussed in A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 72.80
(1969).
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inspection service, in which role it is just as differentiable as the
automobile liability insurer.
The Functional Approach
So far this discussion has dealt with the arguments that attack
the problem by asking: Who is the carrier? Is. he the employer, or
is he a third person? As indicated at the outset, there is a second
approach, the functional approach, that asks not who the insurer is,
but what he was doing.
Three categories can here be discerned. The carrier may have
been performing a duty imposed on the employer by law; he may
have been performing a function which, whether or not required by
law, was at least relevant to his role as a workmen's compensation
carrier; or the function may have been unrelated to workmen's
compensation altogether. The first category is well represented by
the Maryland cases of Flood v. Merchant Mutual Insurance Co.0
and Donohue v. Maryland Casualty Co." The court in Flood held
that the insurer, in selecting and providing a physician, was
performing a duty imposed on the employer by the compensation
statute, and therefore should obtain the employer's immunity. The
federal court carried this reasoning a step further in applying it to a
safety-inspection case. In Donohue, the court said:
In this case the duty which the insurer is charged with performing negligently
is not a duty imposed on the employer by Article 101, but it is a duty which
is imposed on the employer at common law. An employer has the duty to
provide a reasonably safe place to work, and this includes the duty to make
inspections and to take safety measures in fulfillment of that obligationY
"3230 Md. 373, 187 A.2d 320 (1963). Flood was a suit against the carfier for alleged
malpractice by two physicians selected by the carrier. The statute in question permitted third-
party suits against persons "'other than the employer." MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58
(1957). The Maryland court held that the suit would not lie, since the carriers "stand in the
pdsition of the employer." 230 Md. at 377, 187 A.2d at 322. Note that the plaintiff's pleadings
"contended that the appellee [insurer] was liable on the basis of respondeat superior and on
the basis that appellee did not exercise a reasonable degree of intelligence, skill and ability in
the selection of the physicians." Id. at 376, 187 A.2d at 322.
m 363 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1966), affg for reasons in opinion below 248 F. Supp. 588 (D.
Md. 1965). Under article 101 of the Maryland Code, the employer's immunity is extended
to the carrier for an injury resulting from a hazard which should have been discovered during
the carrier's safety inspections. 'The Flood case was accepted as authoritatively settling
Maryland law.
"248 F. Supp. at 591. At the end of the quoted passage the court cites Long Co. v. State
Acc. Fund, 156 Md. 639, 144 A. 755 (1929).
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There are two possible flaws in this rationale. One was pointed
out by a Michigan court:
We cannot say that as a matter of law the duty assumed in this case was the
duty of the employer and not an independent undertaking on the part of the
insurer for its own internal purposes. Perhaps the duty assumed was
coincident with that of the employer, but was that what the insurer was
asserted to have assumed?-
Reinforcing this criticism is the undoubted fact that the carrier has
reasons of its own for making safety inspections. The more it can
cut down on accidents, the lower will be its outlay for losses.
Moreover, as was emphasized in Nelson," the provision of safety
services is a major selling and advertising feature with some insurers,
including the defendant in Nelson. Furthermore, the Nelson dissent
brought out the fact that the insurer had not taken on the entire
safety ins.pection job; what it did was partial and supplementary.
"[N]o one concerned relied upon the insurance company for
complete inspection."'" The dissent distinguished cases in which an
insurance company purports to take over the safety inspection
function so completely as to displace the employer. If it does less
than this, surely the reasoning of Donohue should not apply. And,
the chances are that in these cases the insurer has done less than this,
since they would greatly increase their chances of being held liable
under tort law if they took on the entire safety inspection job, thus
supplying the element of reliance required in some jurisdictions.'
Add to all this the rule that the employer's safe-place duty is not
delegable anyway, in the sense of delegating so as to escape
liability," and little remains to support the concept that the insurer
in making inspections has assumed a duty imposed on the employer
by law.
The other flaw in the Flood-Donohue formulation is that, even
if it is true that the insurer assumed a duty imposed on the employer,
that simply is not the same thing as saying that the insurer is the
-"Ray v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 10 Mich. App. 55, 64, 158 N.W. 2d 786, 790 (1968). See
note 47 supra and accompanying text.
$13 1Ill. 2d at 79-80, 199 N.E.2d at 776. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
"199 N.E.2d at 796.
"See Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 201 F. 617 (7th
Cir. 1912).
"Conner v. Utah Constr. & Mining, 231 Cal. App. 2d 263, 276, 41 Cal. Rptr. 728, 737
(1964); Maia v. Security Lumber & Concrete Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 16, 20, 324 P.2d 657,
660 (1958).
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employer. To say that it is only equitable that the carrier should
enjoy the employer's immunities to the extent he assumes his
burdens may appeal to the court's sense of symmetry and fairness.
The only catch is that this is not what the statute says. Nor does it
necessarily follow that the carrier should be treated here exactly the
same as the employer. The employer assumes compensation burdens
in exchange for tort immunity. The carrier assumes compensation
burdens in exchange for payment of an insurance premium. In the
one respect that is decisive for present purposes, their positions are
not identical at all. From this it can be deduced that, if the
legislature chose to grant immunity by name to the employer and
not to the insurer, this is not to be explained as some kind of
oversight, so long as there is a perfectly reasonable explanation on
grounds of compensation theory and policy that could account for
the difference.
The second category in the functional approach, that of relation
of the activity to the compensation system, is best represented by the
federal district court opinion in Kotarski v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co.."
If the activity of the insurer, for which it is alleged to be negligent, bore no
substantial relation to its position as the employer's workmen's compensation
carrier, (e.g., if an automobile collision occurred between the employee, while
driving his employer's vehicle on his employer's business, and a vehicle
operated by the insurance company's employee who also happened to be
acting in the course of his employment) there would be no logical reason to
hold the carrier to be immune. However, where the carrier is performing an
integral part of its function under the Workmen's Compensation Act, it
should be immune under the same reasoning which makes it immune when
performing a required activity."
At this point, it may simply be said that this passage represents
the "same reasoning" already shown to be shaky for'several
reasons, and obviously the case is weaker, if anything, when the
activity is merely related rather than required. Indeed, the court goes
on to say that "although the statute does not require insurers to
u244 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Mich. 1965), affd, 372 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1967).
"Id. at 558 (emphasis added). See also West v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 697
(E.D. Mo. 1966). Relying on Hughes v. Maryland Cas. Co., 229 Mo. App. 472, 76 S.W.2d
1101 (1934) (discussed in note 3 supra), and adding the 1965 Missouri statutory amendment
quoted in note 3 supra, the court in West found employer immunity in a safety inspection
case. The holding could be said to partake of the nature of dictum, since the court had already
held the action barred by the statute of limitations; but under the present Missouri statute
the rule seems clear enough in any event.
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inspect the buildings and equipment of employers, they must do so
for their own protection." 5 And so we are left with the rather odd
conclusion that as a reward for doing what it must do for its own
protection the carrier should in addition be given an implied bonus
in the form of tort immunity at the expense of a plaintiff injured by
its negligence.
The third category, included merely to round out the pattern, is
that of a function unrelated to compensation. It is well illustrated
by the example in the Kotarski quotation and requires no further
discussion.
It is interesting to note that the strength of connection of the
particular function with the compensation system has figured in
attempts to distinguish between the malpractice cases and the safety
inspection cases-in both directions. In the California case of Burns
v. State Compensation Insurance Fund,6" a safety inspection case,
the court observed that the only case that had appeared since the
Breceda case, 67 a California precedent which it considered
controlling, was Mager v. United Hospital"8 in New Jersey-a
medical services case-and added:
Arguably the Breceda court would find that in maintaining a medical clinic
the insurer steps from its role as insurer since the actual performance of the
medical care, as opposed to compensation for its cost, is not one of the
purposes of the workmen's compensation system."
Breceda had held that safety inspections were "inextricably
interwoven" with the Fund's status of insurer, since fostering of safe
working conditions is one of the principal purposes of the
workmen's compensation act. But so is the fostering of recovery and
rehabilitation of injured workmen through provisions of medical
services. One only has to read the Burns quotation to realize that it
rings very false at the end. Something is obviously wrong with the
attempted distinction.
Similarly, the Massachusetts court in Matthews v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co.,70 a safety inspection case, in attempting to
"1244 F. Supp. at 558.
6265 Cal. App. 2d 98, 71 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1968). See note 32 supra.
"State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Ct., 237 Cal. App. 2d 416, 46 Cal. Rptr. 891
(1965) (discussed in note 33 supra).
u Mager v. United Hosp., 88 N.J. Super. 421, 212 A.2d 664 (1965), affd per curialn, 46
N.J. 398, 217 A.2d 325 (1966).
"265 Cal. App. 2d at 102 n.2, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 329 n.2.
70354 Mass. 470, 238 N.E.2d 348 (1968).
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distinguish the statement in McDonald v. Employers' Liability
Assurance Corp.,7 a malpractice case, that the insurer is a person
other than the insured, said:
We do not extend the implications of this statement to conclude the present
case, as we are of the opinion that our Workmen's Compensation Act does
not have as a purpose that the insurer be sued as a third party for
performance of a function which furthers the goals of the entire compensation
programY2
Are we then, in this era of emphasis on the dominant role of
sustained high-quality medical care and rehabilitation in the
compensation process, to imply that medical care does not further
the goals of the entire compensation program?
By contrast, in some cases it seems to be assumed that it is the
provision of medical care that is most obviously part of the
compensation process. Thus, the Smith opinion brushed aside the
malpractice cases as not in point.1 The Nelson case distinguished
them as involving a function performed pursuant to a policy or
statutory obligation, while the safety inspection was "entirely
gratuitous conduct." Even in the Flood-Donohue cases in
Maryland, 5 one gets the impression that the medical-services case,
which came first, was viewed as the more firmly grounded, being
based on a statutory requirement, while the safety-inspection case
required an extension of this principle to a common law duty, that
of maintaining a safe work place.
A REAPPRAISAL
The above survey of the many and varied judicial attempts to
find a solution to the carrier-as-third-party problem indicates that
none has been altogether satisfactory. An effort will now be
undertaken to supply a rational formulation applicable to those
states whose statutory language does not expressly identify the
carrier with the employer or extend to him immunity from third-
party liability.
At the outset, the conceptual approach will be passed over in
71288 Mass. 170, 192 N.E. 608 (1934).
n354 Mass. at ...., 238 N.E.2d at 350.
"Smith v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564 (1960). See note 2
supra.
"Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 111. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769, rev'g 39 Il1. App. 2d
73, 187 N.E.2d 425 (1963). See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
"See notes 55 & 56 supra and accompanying text.
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favor of the functional. Fictions have no place in the interpretation
of a detailed modern statute. Concepts like "the blending of jural
personalities,"76 and statements that "the insurer merges into the
employer," or "stands in his shoes," or even "is the employer,"
may serve as metaphors describing a conclusion," but they are not
legal reasons supporting a conclusion. Far-reaching consequences
wrung from fine points of statutory phrasing, or from practically
insubstantial distinctions between primary and secondary carrier
liability, or from supposed incongruity in the picture of a subrogated
carrier suing itself, leave one with the sensation that the essence of
the matter somehow has been missed and that too much is being
made to depend on relatively minor features of the act that were
never designed to control this issue.
When we come to the functional approach, the distinctions on
which the cases turn also prove to be unsatisfactory, inaccurate, and
at times irrelevant: between acts in performance of a duty imposed
on the employer and those volunteered; between safety inspections
and medical services; between acts that further the compensation
program and those that do not. The solution here suggested is this:
a distinction should be drawn between the carrier's function of
payment for benefits and services, on the one hand, and, on the
other, any 'function it assumes in the way of direct or physical
performance of services related to the act. For negligent performance
of the latter it should be liable in tort as a "person other than the
employer."
This distinction has not been fully developed in any jurisdiction
but was adumbrated in the Mager decision in New Jersey." It came
about in this way: the court cited the new line of cases holding
carriers liable-Nelson, Fabricius, Mays, and Smith. It observed
that the insurer sought to distinguish these cases on the ground that
"Barrette v. Travelers Ins. Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 1,246 A.2d 102 (1968). See note 48 supra.
"Mager v. United Hosp., 88 N.J. Super. 421, 212 A.2d 664 (1965), affd per curiant for
reasons in opinion below, 46 N.J. 398, 217 A.2d 325 (1966) (7-0, one justice concurring only
in the result). The case reversed 81 N.J. Super. 585, 196 A.2d 282 (1963). Decedent suf-
fered a compensable injury, and was treated at a clinic operated by the defendant, his
employer's workmen's compensation carrier. The clinic was alleged to have negligently caused
decedent serious injury and eventual death. The court held that the insurer, as operator of
the clinic, was not immune to a tort action by the administratrix of decedent's estate. Cf.
Viducich V. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 80 N.J. Super. 15, 192 A.2d 596 (1963) (compensation
carrier found not to have contracted to perform safety inspections; summary judgment for
carrier; issue of immunity avoided).
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in them the obligation the carrier was carrying out-safety
inspection-was not an obligation imposed by statute, whereas here
the carrier, by maintaining a clinic, was carrying out a duty imposed
by the statute, requiring the employer to furnish medical and
hospital services. However, the court said "there is nothing in the
Workmen's Compensation Act which requires a compensation
carrier, any more than an employer, to maintain and operate a
clinic."78 Here at last is the key this area of compensation law had
been waiting for-the distinction between paying for services and
physically performing them. The two have been lumped together in
almost all treatments of the problem, although on closer
exanination the two actions have a crucial difference. It is virtually
impossible to cause physical injury by writing a check. It is very
possible to cause physical injury by administering medical treatment
to a patient or by making a safety inspection.
It is true that safety is a central concern of the compensation
program. It is equally true that medical care is of the essence of
compensation. And it is true that the insurer is a vital part of the
compensation process-when it is performing its basic role of
paving. But it is not of the essence of the compensation process that
the carrier should step out of its fundamental role as financial
guarantor and payor and go into the safety inspection service or
medical clinic business directly. There is a very big difference. If the
carrier merely puts up the money and the. employee obtains medical
services from an independent physician or clinic, the employee in
case of malpractice has someone he can sue. But, if the carrier
performs the service directly and if third-party liability is destroyed,
the employee has no one to sue. The Mager court continued:
"Defendant's operation of such a clinic was clearly in its own
interest. Since it is ultimately bound to pay for medical services
provided by insured employers, its clinic was obviously a means
adopted to reduce costs and achieve possible economies."71 The
court could have added that one of these economies-in the absence
of the Mager result-would be the privilege of operating a clinic free
of the normal cost of liability for negligence, which means free of
the cost of premiums on malpractice liability insurance.
It is interesting to note that something like this distinction was
7888 N.J. Super. at 427. 212 A.2d at 667.
75Id.
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apparent in what seems to have been the earliest case imposing third-
party liability on a carrier for an act connected with workmen's
compensation. In a case decided in 193 1,8 the carrier had insisted
that the injured employee be transferred from one hospital to
another. The employee's injury was aggravated by the roughness of
the trip, and the carrier was held liable for the aggravation. The
court drew a sharp distinction between merely furnishing medical
care, which could not impose liability on the carrier even for the
negligence of the physician, and interfering in medical care, which
might result in liability if the interference was wrongful. Here it was
found to be so, because the transfer was ordered without competent
medical advice. The court said:
The Workmen's Compensation Act contemplates the selection by the
employer of competent physicians, surgeons and hospitals, and that the
injured employee will be treated under their direction and not under the
direction of the employer. Where the employer attempts to control their
action, he violates the rights of the injured employee and for that injury the
Workmen's Compensation Act provides no remedy. For damages arising
from such an injury, the employer is liable in an action at law so far as the
damages are not cognizable under the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act."'
Thus, the decisive question becomes: Did the insurer control the
event that caused injury, as distinguished from furnishing it in the
sense of paying for it? By this test, the result in Mager follows easily.
The carrier certainly controlled the operation of its clinic. The
clearest case for liability, then, is that in which the carrier actually
performs or controls the performance of the services that caused the
harm. And under the same test of control, the carrier that actually
performs safety inspections should logically be suable.
But what about negligence of the carrier in selection of the
physician? It is ancient learning, going back to the cases involving
selection of doctors by railroads, that if the employer exercises
reasonable care in selection he is not liable for the acts of the doctor.
"The reason is that A does not undertake to treat B through the
agency of the physician, but only to procure for B the services of
the physician. The relation of master and servant is not established
"
0 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Watts, 148 Okla. 28, 296 P. 977 (1931).
"Id. at 34, 296 P. at 983 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the court earlier had
explained that it was using the term "employer" to cover the carrier.
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between A and the physician." But the old cases also agreed that
the railroad or employer furnishing medical care was bound to use
reasonable care in the selection of a physician and was liable in an
action at law for negligence in that selection.8
Most of the cases involving attempts to fasten liability on the
carrier for negligence of a physician in treatment of a compensable
injury have never found it necessary to go into the distinction
between merely paying for such services and failing to use care in
selection of the physician.8 Sometimes the opinion indicates that
negligence in selection was alleged;" sometimes it does not, and in
such cases one gets the impression that some kind of respondeat
superior liability is being relied upon."8 Under the distinction here
proposed, it would be logical to assimilate the act of selecting a
physician to the act of performing medical service, rather than to the
mere payment for services. Again the operative consideration is that
the act of selection is an act which, if negligently performed, could
cause physical injury. To the extent that the carrier exercises the
function of selecting the physician, it shares in the control of the
event, which cannot be said if it merely supplies the money to pay
for the services. Fernandez v. Gantz, 7 often cited as authority for
the third-party immunity of carriers, actually contains a definite
implication that carriers might be liable for negligent selection. The
court said that the carrier was not liable for the alleged malpractice
of a physician selected by the employer "in the absence of any
negligence in the selection of such physician, which is not here
alleged.""
It was said earlier that the carrier could not cause physical harm
by writing a check. It might be contended, however, that he can
cause physicial harm by refusal to write a check. In Noe v. Travelers
Insurance Co.," the carrier's own physician had recommended
'
2 Annot., 19 A.L.R. 1168, 1185 (1922). See. e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Zeiler, 54 Kan.
340, 38 P. 282 (1894); Pearl v. West End St. Ry., 176 Mass. 177, 57 N.E. 339 (1900).
"See. e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Watts, 148 Okla. 28, 296 P. 977 (1931). See also cases
collected at Annot., 19 A.L.R. 1168, 1185 (1922).
" See, e.g., the California malpractice cases cited at note 3 supra. See also Hughes v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 229 Mo. App. 472, 76 S.W.2d 1101 (1934).
"Flood v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 230 Md. 373, 187 A.2d 320 (1963).
"See. e.g., Schulz v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 125 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Wash. 1954).
"113 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1953).
uld. at 764.
" 172 Cal. App. 2d 731, 342 P.2d 976 (1959).
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surgery, but the carrier had "wilfully" refused to authorize it. The
plaintiff employee alleged that the resultant delay aggravated his
compensable injury. Suit against the carrier was held barred by the
exclusive-remedy clause.
This result is correct under the proposed test. If at first glance
it appears harsh, recall that the employee has it within his power to
protect himself. He could have obtained the surgery and compelled
the carrier to pay for it." A little reflection will show that any other
rule would be unworkable. To hold the carrier liable in these
circumstances would mean that tort litigation would flow from
almost every difference of medical judgment, or perhaps even from
delay in making payments.
In concluding this analysis of the carrier as third party, one must
note that almost every opinion on the issue as related to safety
inspections has included a treatment of the element of public policy.
A typical statement is that in Kotarski,91 quoted with approval by
the Massachusetts court as the central ground of its decision in
Matthews:92
Insurance companies which engage in accident prevention work, the social
desirability of which cannot be questioned, should be able to do so without
incurring unlimited liability for failing to discover a hazard that some jury
might think should have been discovered. If an insurance company can escape
tort liability altogether by not making any inspections on the premises of the
insured, but may incur unlimited tort liability by making some inspections,
it more than likely will decline to make any, unless required to do so by
statute. The ultimate losers will be workmen and their families.3
This type of policy argument also weighed heavily with the
dissent in the Nelson case. 4 Justice Schaefer said that "[tihe opinion
thus apparently announces a kind of 'all or nothing' rule of law that
will frustrate the possibility of limited inspection services by
requiring that if any inspections are undertaken, complete
inspections must be made."95 To this several answers have been
made. One is that the carriers still have enough self-interest at stake
in making inspections that they will continue the practice even under
"See A. LARsON, supra note 5, § 61.12.
"See note 45 supra and.accompanying text.
'
2See note 6 supra and accompanyingtext.
93244 F. Supp. at 558-59.
"See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
"331 II1. 2d at 119, 199 N.E.2d at 796.
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the shadow of potential tort liability.,6 Another is that in any event
no inspection at all is preferable to a negligent inspection.97
In the Nelson case, the defendant for purposes of the tort issue
stressed that its inspection was only partial and casual, so as to
defeat the argument that anyone would rely on it. The argument
backfired when the public policy argument was raised. The majority
said:
[T]he scope and value of the safety inspections, represented thus in an effort
to sustain this contention, are highly inconsistent with defendant's claims
under the negligence phase of the case that the activity of its safety engineer
was only "casual observation," for its own purposes.u
But the all-purpose answer to the public Oolicy argument, in
practically every case from Smith on down, has been the familiar
maxim that questions of public policy are for the legislature.
Sometimes this maxim appears as the last refuge of a cautious court
confronted with a hard decision. But here it makes good sense. The
issue of public policy is a complex one, and it is by no means limited
to workmen's compensation law. The tort issue at stake, whether the
performance of volunteered services, in the absence of reliance, can
impose liability for negligence in the performance, is in its way as
controversial as the compensation law issue here discussed. Probably
the reason that Nelson-type decisions have not, been even more
frequent than they are is the inability of plaintiffs to hurdle the tort
issue in states that require a showing of reliance.9' An adequate
legislative solution, then, might have to deal with the tort problem
as well as the exclusive-remedy issue.
Legislative attention is also desirable because the optimum
solution of the exclusive-remedy issue itself may well be something
other than a yes-or-no answer. The public policy factor. is by no
means completely one-sided. True, public policy would favor
promotion of safety through safety inspections by insurance carriers
and would presumptively disfavor anything that would tend to
discourage such efforts. At the same time, it must be asked: Does
"See. e.g., Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963), revg 211 F. Supp.
541 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 121 N.W.2d
361 (1963).
"Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 121 N.W.2d 361 (1963).
"31 111. 2d at 110, 199 N.E.2d at 792.
"A discussion of the tort issue is, of course, out of place here. The Nelsoh opinion contains
an extensive treatment of the topic. See also lasrA-ErANr (SECOND) oF ToRTs § 323 (1965).
1141Vol. 1969:1I117]
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
public policy generally favor relieving tortfeasors of the burden of
paying for the consequences of their wrongs? If it does not, the issue
becomes one of balancing policy considerations. Is the public interest
in encouraging safety inspections by carriers so great that the public
is willing to add to the carrier's own motives for this activity a
further incentive in the form of immunity from normal liability for
its negligence?
The issue is complicated further by the implications of the point
raised by Justice Schaefer in his Nelson dissent.1t 0 Just how valuable
is the insurer's safety inspection contribution if it is limited, casual,
and supplemental? Would an all-or-nothing responsibility really be
a bad thing? Might it not be desirable to be able to assume that
anyone undertaking safety inspections around a plant will do a
complete job and take the responsibility for it?
These are all factors bearing on the public policy argument.
Clearly this is not the kind of choice that should flow from some
quirk of language in a statute written long before the modern
practice of systematic carrier safety inspections was even dreamed
of.
The need for legislative involvement also stems from the fact that
the policy argument turns on facts that should be known rather than
guessed at. Have carriers quit making inspections in states where
they are vulnerable to suit? If so, have other ways been found to get
the same job done? No statistics have been published at this writing
that cast any light on these factual questions.
This suggestion of overall legislative analysis of the problem is
not satisfied by the kind of precipitous legislative reversals of judicial
decisions that have occurred, for example, in New Hampshire and
Pennsylvania' 01-amendments that have taken the form of expressly
identifying the carrier with the employer. It might be noted in this
connection that this type of amendment may not in itself lock the
door completely on carrier liability. Under the dual-capacity
doctrine, the employer himself conceivably may be liable as a third
party, 10 2 the most vivid example being Duprey v. Shane,' in which
the employer-chiropractor was held, in his capacity as doctor, liable
to his own employee for negligence in treatment. Now suppose that
'"See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
"'See notes 2 & 26 supra and accompanying text.
'"A. LARSON, supra note 5, § 72.80 (1969).
" 241 P.2d 78 (Cal. App.), affd 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (195 1).
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a case were to arise in California, where the identification of carrier
with employer is complete after the carrier assumes liability, in
which the carrier operated a clinic and injured the employee through
negligent treatment in the clinic. How could Duprey be
distinguished? Indeed, the California court in Burns!04 may have
foreshadowed a holding similar to the New Jersey result in Mager,10 5
for in distinguishing that case from the Breceda casee the California
court said:
However, the holding in that case is not antithetical to the reasoning in
Breceda. Breceda held that when an insurer assumes by contract the duty to
inspect, it acts as an insurer. . . .Arguably the Breceda court would find
that in maintaining a medical clinic the insurer steps from its role as insurer
since the actual performance of the medical care, as opposed to compensation
for its cost, is not one of the purposes of the workmen's compensation
system.'07
Since the greater includes the lesser, so to speak, the door is still
open a crack-even in states explicitly identifying the carrier with
the employer-to hold the carrier as third party in situations where
the employer might be so held, because of actually performing some
function that generates a set of obligations to the employee
independent of his obligations as employer.
An example of the kind of statutory amendment that gives
evidence of being something more than a reflex reaction against
carrier liability is the Wisconsin statute addressed, not specifically
to inspection by compensation carriers, but to the liability of
insurers generally for safety inspections. 08 It rules out such liability
generally, but with two exceptions. The first is active negligence in
creating the condition causing the injury, which seems a rather
unlikely situation. The second applies to services required to be
performed under a written service contract. This exception is no
doubt designed t9 take some of the vagueness out of the relation
created by voluntary and even casual inspections. Of course,
Wisconsin already had a rather explicit statute assimilating the
carrier to the employer, 09 but the new statute is evidence of a
consciousness. that the total subject of safety inspection liability is
deserving of legislative attention.
'"See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
1"See notes 33 & 68 supra and accompanying text.
'"See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
1"265 Cal. App. 2d at 102 n.2, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 329 n.2.
"'The statute is set out in full at note 32 supra. Iowa has also approached the problem by
way of a general statute on safety inspection liability; see note 9 supra and accompanying text.
'"See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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